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I.
¶1

“If a man puts [corn] into my bag, in which before there is some corn, the whole is
mine, because it is impossible to distinguish what was mine from what is his.”1 The
Supreme Court of Canada recently rejected this principle in its decision in Monsanto v.
Schmeiser. 2 Canada now imposes strict liability for infringement involving unlicensed
use of genetically modified (“GM”) seed, even in situations in which natural forces
transfer the intellectual property into an innocent person’s crops.3 This article discusses
the Schmeiser case and presents a comparative analysis of Canadian and American patent
infringement provisions. It further discusses possible alternatives to holding farmers who
unintentionally possess a patented gene strictly liable for infringement.
II.

¶2

¶3

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND OF THE PERCY SCHMEISER CASE

Monsanto owns a patent on Roundup Ready® canola seed.4 Roundup Ready®
seed is a genetically modified organism (“GMO”), which is resistant to Roundup®
herbicide (glyphosate). Farmers who purchase these seeds from Monsanto can spray a
whole field without worrying about harming the crops, keeping weed control costs low.5
Unfortunately, the only way to distinguish between a canola plant grown from Roundup
Ready® seed and a mundane plant is through a chemical test or microscopic inspection.6
Therefore, it is difficult for patented seed owners to monitor use and unauthorized users
may have no idea they are in possession of a patented seed.
Percy Schmeiser is a resident of Saskatchewan, Canada who has been farming for
over 55 years.7 Schmeiser discovered Roundup Ready® plants in his fields after some of
*

I would like to give a special thanks to my future husband Justin A. Kwong for without his inspiration,
encouragement and agricultural knowledge this note would not have been possible.
1
Colwill v. Reeves, 2 Camp. 575, 576 (1811). See also 15A C.J.S. Confusion of Goods § 6 (2005); 1
Am. Jur. 2d Accession and Confusion § 1 (2004).
2
Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. 910.
3
See Id. at 910-11; Keith Aoki, Recent Skirmishes in the Seed Wars, 11 CARDOZO J. INTL. & COMP. L.
247, 292-93 (2003).
4
U.S. Patent No. 5,352,605 (issued Oct. 28, 1993); Can. Patent No. 1,313,830 (issued Aug. 6, 1986).
5
Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. at 915-16.
6
Id. at 914.
7
Profile of Percy and Louise Schmeiser, http://www.percyschmeiser.com/profile.htm (last visited Nov.
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his canola survived numerous sprayings of Roundup®.8 Despite the fact that he had
never purchased the seed, Schmeiser took no action to contact Monsanto or remove
plants he knew to be patented.9 Following an anonymous tip, Monsanto’s investigators
confirmed the presence of plants bearing the gene in Schmesier’s fields.10 Monsanto then
brought suit for infringement of its patented gene and sought an injunction, delivery of all
infringing seeds or crops in Schmeiser’s possession, plaintiff’s costs, actual damages and
punitive damages.11
At trial, Schmeiser claimed the genetically modified seeds appeared on his fields
without his intent and were unwelcome.12 Five farmers in Schmeiser’s area13 and
approximately 40% of Canadian farmers use Roundup Ready® canola seed.14 During
cross-examination, Monsanto’s lead investigator admitted there was no indication that
Schmeiser illegally obtained the patented gene.15 Tests conducted by Monsanto
estimated that 95-98% of Schmeiser’s 1000+ acres were contaminated.16 The trial court
concluded it was unlikely that such an extensive proportion of contamination was due to
windblown seeds alone.17 The trial court also dismissed the contention that Monsanto
had waived its rights to the patent by not controlling the spread of the gene, citing the
company’s monitoring activities and policy of removing contaminated plants upon
request.18
In addition to arguing lack of intent, Schmeiser asserted several alternative
defenses to Monsanto’s infringement claim. First, Schmeiser claimed that the Roundup
Ready® gene was comparable to a stray bull.19 “Stray bull” cases are part of a larger law
of admixture wherein, for example, a bull belonging to a cattle rancher wanders off his
property and produces a calf with a cow belonging to a different rancher. Under the
doctrine, the mutual ownership claims are settled in favor of the second rancher.20 The
trial court distinguished Schmeiser from the stray bull case law based on the fact that
Monsanto does not have rights to the plant, only the gene’s use.21 Second, instead of
basing his defense on “innocent infringement,” Schmeiser claimed he did not use the
patented gene because herbicide was not sprayed on his fields.22 After analyzing the
patent claims, this argument was rejected because the claims make no requirement for
17, 2005).
8
Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, C.P.R. (4th) 204, [2001] F.C.J. No. 436(QL), ¶ 38-39.
9
Id. ¶ 40.
10
Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. at 912; Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.J. 436, ¶ 37-58.
11
Id. ¶ 9.
12
Id. ¶ 11.
13
Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. at 911.
14
Aoki, supra note 3, at 294.
15
Br. of Res. ¶ 38, Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.J. 436.
16
Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.J. 436 ¶ 53.
17
Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.J. 436 ¶ 118. There is some controversy as to the statistical accuracy and
reliability of Monsanto’s methods for determining the amount of its patented seed on Schmeiser’s fields.
See Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.J. 436 ¶ 62, 73, 177; Br. of Res. ¶ 26, 55-118, Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.J. 436.
18
Id. ¶ 96-98.
19
Id. ¶ 93.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. ¶ 121; Br. of Res. ¶ 160, Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.J. 436.
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use.23 Finally, Schmeiser argued that the patent was invalid because something that is
neither caused by human intervention nor controllable by humans is not the proper
subject matter of a patent.24 The court disagreed, holding that the patent was valid.25
The trial court ultimately determined that Monsanto was entitled to relief in the
form of the requested injunction, delivery of its patented seeds or plants in Schmeiser’s
possession, profits of $105,000, damages of $15,450 and exemplary damages of $25,000
(all amounts are in Canadian dollars).26 The Federal Court of Appeals affirmed.27
III.

¶7

¶8

¶9

[2005

THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA’S DECISION

In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the lower court’s holding
in a finding of infringement.28 In its determination of infringement, the Canadian
Supreme Court looked to whether the “defendant’s activity deprived the inventor in
whole or in part, directly or indirectly, of full enjoyment of the monopoly conferred by
law.”29 A Canadian patentee has “the exclusive right, privilege and liberty of making,
constructing and using the invention and selling it to others to be used. . . .”30 This means
that, in the case of GM seeds, the owner has the exclusive right to the gene in question,
regardless of how the gene appeared or the intent of the farmer on whose fields the gene
was found.
The first step in determining use is to compare the object of the patent with the
defendant’s activity, and assess whether the defendant’s action involved that object.31
Use applies to patented products, processes, and their output.32 A defendant’s activity
may involve the object of the invention even if it is not used for its intended purpose.33
“While intention is generally irrelevant to determining whether there has been use and
hence, infringement, the absence of intention to employ or gain any advantage from the
invention may be relevant to rebutting the presumption of use raised by possession.” 34
The Supreme Court found that Schmeiser did not make the patented plant within
the meaning of the Canadian Patent Act.35 The Court held that Schmeiser’s saving and
planting of the seed containing the patented gene, and subsequent harvest and sale of
infringing canola, was equivalent to utilization and was commercial in nature.36
Analogizing cells to Lego® blocks, the Court explained that “if an infringing use were
alleged in building a structure with patented Lego® blocks, it would be no bar to a

23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

4

Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.J. 436 ¶ 122.
Id. ¶ 78.
Id. ¶ 90. The specifics and merits of this position are beyond the scope of this article.
Id. ¶128.
Monsanto v. Schmeiser, [2003] F.C. 165, 205.
Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. at 937.
Id. at 919.
Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 44 (1985) (Can.).
Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. at 922.
Id. at 921.
Id. at 923.
Id. at 927.
Id. at 917.
Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. at 930.
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finding of infringement that only the blocks were patented and not the entire structure.”37
Although that is a broad interpretation, the Supreme Court justified the conclusion
because it follows the principle that the patent owner is entitled to the entire monopoly
and all of its business advantages.38 Justice Arbour’s dissent found this analogy
particularly weak because the structuring of Legos® requires human intervention, which
is not an element of the infringer’s actions in this case.39 Unmoved by this argument, the
majority determined that the action of sowing and cultivating plants in order to make a
profit was enough of a “deliberate and careful” action to support a finding of use under
the principles and interpretations of the Canadian Patent Act.40
¶10
Mere possession of a patented article may amount to infringement where
unfulfilled intention to use is to the detriment of the patentee. 41 In some cases,
possession of a patented chattel has an insurance value also known as a “stand-by
utility.”42 For example, a fire extinguisher that is never used is nevertheless valuable
because it is available at a moment’s notice should a fire occur.43 In Schmeiser’s case, he
did not utilize the invention by spraying with Roundup® but the fact that he could have
sprayed is a stand-by utility.44 If there is reason to spray in the future, no harm would
have come to his crops as a result of the patented gene that was now present in his
crops.45 Schmeiser argued he did not have stand-by utility because he did not possess
enough Roundup® to effectively treat his fields should the need arise.46 However, none
of the courts considered whether Schmeiser actually possessed enough Roundup® to
effectively spray his fields.
¶11
Traditionally, intent to infringe is presumed in commercial circumstances unless
the defense shows the contrary.47 Schmeiser claimed he never intended to cultivate the
patented plants.48 The fact that the gene actually hurt Schmeiser’s farming efforts is
convincing evidence of lack of intent.49 Schmeiser practiced a common method of saving
his seed every year (commonly referred to as “brown bagging”), which allowed him to
develop a crop from seeds with desirable genetic characteristics.50 The contamination of
the patented seeds ruined several years of work Schemeiser dedicated to developing his
own strain of canola.51 The presumption that Schmeiser intended to cultivate the
patented plants could have been rebutted with a showing that he quickly attempted to
remove both the plants containing Monsanto’s patented gene after receiving notice from
37

Id. at 921.
Id. at 991-92.
39
Id. at 954 (Arbour, J., dissenting in part).
40
Id. at 935.
41
HAROLD G. FOX, CANADIAN PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE, 383-84 (4th ed. 1969).
42
Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. at 923.
43
Id. The court looks for the intent to use the patented article as a stand-by utility. Id. at 924-925.
44
Id. at 933.
45
Id.
46
Br. of Res. ¶ 48-49, Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.J. 436.
47
Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. at 926-27.
48
Id. at 933-34.
49
Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.J. 436 ¶ 11; Percy Schmeiser, Facing Down Goliath, One Farmer’s Battle with
a GM Giant, 32 Acres USA 28 (Jan, 2002).
50
Br. of Res. ¶ 7, Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.J. 436.
51
Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.J. 436 ¶ 29-30; Br. of Res. ¶ 7, Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.J. 436.
38
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Monsanto regarding the infringement, and that the infringing plant concentration on his
fields was more likely caused by seeds having blown onto his property.52 These defenses
were unavailable to Schmeiser because he continued the practice of saving seeds and
planting them after Monsanto notified him of his infringement.53
¶12
Schmeiser argued that if no advantage had been taken and there was no intent to
use, there was no infringement.54 Schmeiser did not commercially spray with Roundup®
nor did he market his canola as containing the patented gene.55 The Supreme Court
rejected this argument, and held that increased profits are irrelevant56 and the potential for
future revenue opportunities, such as brown bagging, deprives the patent owner of its
entitlement.57 Even if it was unlikely that Schmeiser would ever benefit from the patent,
the opportunity is all that is relevant.
¶13
The Supreme Court found that Schmeiser’s actions constituted infringement.
Monsanto’s evidence at trial, estimating that 95-98% of Schmeiser’s 1000+ acres
contained canola plants with its patented gene,58 convinced the Supreme Court that the
infringing gene’s presence was too pervasive to be caused entirely by accidental
delivery.59 The Supreme Court found that Monsanto’s rights to the gene were recognized
by the law and Schmeiser could not defend against Monsanto’s infringement action by
claiming a lack of intent.60 Monsanto argued that they took reasonable efforts to avoid
the spread of seeds to other neighbors and the Court stated that it was not incumbent upon
Monsanto to do more than was reasonably necessary to prevent the inadvertent spread of
its seeds by the individuals who legally purchased them.61 Schmeiser was put on notice
of his infringement, yet he continued to plant GM contaminated seed.62 Despite a finding
of infringement, the Supreme Court found Schmeiser did not benefit from the Roundup
Ready® gene because he did not use Roundup® on his crops, thus made no more profit
than he would have if he did not use the patented seeds.63 The Supreme Court, therefore,
ruled that Monsanto was not entitled to damages.64
IV.
¶14

THE REALITY OF WINDBLOWN SEEDS

With 600,000 acres of Roundup Ready® canola planted in the U.S. and over
4,000,000 acres planted in Canada,65 GMO farming is becoming a common practice.
52

Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. at 933.
Id. at 933-34.
54
Id. at 932.
55
Id. at 938-39.
56
Id. at 926.
57
Id. at 933.
58
Id. at 912.
59
Id. at 929. There is some controversy as to the statistical accuracy and reliability of Monsanto’s
methods for determining the amount of its patented seed on Schmeiser’s fields. See Schmeiser, [2001]
F.C.J. 436 ¶ 62, 73, 177; Br. of Res. ¶ 26, 55-118.
60
Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. at 911, 930.
61
See Schmeiser, [2003] F.C. at 196 (the Supreme Court of Canada did not revisit this issue).
62
Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. at 936.
63
Id. at 938-39.
64
Id. at 939.
65
Monsanto Co., Achievements in Plant Biotechnology - Evaluation: Canola,
53
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Seeds may be spread by many vectors, including wind, wild animals, combines, transport
vehicles, and commingling during storage.66 Wind is a major contributor to the unwanted
spread of GM seeds.67 Bentgrass seed, another GM seed produced by Monsanto, can
travel up to thirteen miles by wind alone.68 Canola seeds are not nearly as mobile, but
because they are small, round, and smooth they also travel easily in the wind.69 Some
estimates show that 800 meters of buffer are required to isolate canola from crosscontamination.70 Other studies, however, indicate that the problem is less severe and that
there is minimal—less than one percent—gene flow through seeds between adjacent
fields.71
¶15
Pollen containment is another concern.72 Plants produce pollen in order to bear the
fruits for which we harvest them. GM plants produce pollen that contains a copy of the
dominant patented gene; therefore, any plant fertilized with GM plant pollen will produce
GM seeds.73 This creates a serious problem for both restricting illegal use of the
technology and for preventing genetic contamination of nearby fields.74 The desirable
traits are significantly reduced in a plant created by cross-pollination.75 Nevertheless,
“once [GM seeds] are released into the environment, the consequences of their
uncontrolled reproduction in the face of decreased biodiversity cannot be predicted.”76
¶16
Dormancy is also a problem. Canola seeds may remain dormant for six to ten years
before germination.77 This means that, even if GM plants are removed from a field, there
is a period of up to ten years where there is a strong likelihood that a portion of the
contaminated seeds that remain in the ground will germinate.78 This makes it
extraordinarily difficult for a farmer to stop infringement once he or she has received
notice that the gene is on his or her property.
V.
¶17

THE DEFINITION OF USE IN THE UNITED STATES

Similar to Canadian practice, American patent owners are granted “the right to
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout
the United States or importing the invention into the United States.”79 Use must
http://www.biotechknowledge.com/biotech/bbasics.nsf/biotech01_canola.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2005).
66
Drew L. Kershen, Of Straying Crops and Patent Rights, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 575, 578 (2004).
67
Karl A. Thiel, Seeds in the Wind: For Monsanto, Patent Protection Stirs Controversy,
http://www.biospace.com/articles/120699.cfm (on file with Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop.).
68
Andrew Pollack, Can Biotech Crops Be Good Neighbors?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2004, § 4, at 12.
69
E. Ann Clark, The Implications of the Schmeiser Decision,
http://www.percyschmeiser.com/crime.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2005).
70
Id.
71
Kershen, supra note 66, at 579.
72
Br. Of Res. ¶ 18, Schmeiser, [2001] F.C.J. 436.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Norman Siebrasse, The Innocent Bystander Problem in the Patenting of Higher Life Forms, 49
MCGILL L.J. 349, 367-68 (2004).
76
Carlos Scott Lopez, Intellectual Property Reform for Genetically Modified Crops: A Legal
Imperative, 20 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 367, 377 (2004).
77
Aoki, supra note 3, at 294.
78
Monsanto Can. Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. at 933-34.
79
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000).
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incorporate, in some way, the principles of the claimed invention.80 Under this
definition, it is important to determine what exactly the invention is. For example, was
the invention at issue in Schmeiser the patented gene or the seed’s ability to survive a
Roundup® spraying? It is logical to think that in order to benefit from the invention,
selling the seed as Roundup Ready® or spraying with Roundup® would be required.
Schmeiser did neither.81 The Canadian Courts determined Monsanto’s claimed invention
was the gene itself and Monsanto’s U.S. patent expressly claims a “gene” in its patent.82
Therefore, not spraying with Roundup® will not eliminate the use factor in the United
States unless the U.S. patent does not claim the gene.
¶18
In the United States, mere possession is not infringement without “threatened or
contemplated” use or sale.83 Planting and harvesting seed constitutes use in Canada and
the U.S. courts seem to be following this interpretation.84
VI.

KNOWLEDGE AND INTENT IN THE UNITED STATES

¶19

In Schmeiser, the Canadian Supreme Court did not consider intent or innocent
discovery of windblown or “blow-by” patented plants.85 The Court decided to focus on
what the alleged infringer did, rather than what he intended to do.86 The United States
takes a similar approach, defining an infringer as one who makes, uses or sells a matter
covered by a patent without the authorization of the owner infringes, regardless of
knowledge or intent.87 Intent to utilize a patented invention is not an element of any form
of infringement.88
¶20
American courts, however, have not completely ignored all evidence of intent. The
Fifth Circuit recognizes that there may be times when literal infringement should be
overlooked, if the infringing device only occasionally strays across the patent boundary
or is too trifling to justify judicial intervention, but does not note any cases where this
theory was successful.89 Reinforcing the theory that intent is irrelevant, the Sixth and
Eighth Circuits have held that proving intent is not necessary, nor is proving knowledge
of the patent’s existence.90 Most importantly, the Supreme Court in Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank explicitly held that
intent is not an element of infringement.91

80

DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.02(4)(c) (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2004).
Clark, supra note 69.
82
Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. at 916-17; U.S. Patent No. 5,352,605 (issued Oct. 28, 1993).
83
CHISUM, supra note 80, at § 16.02(4)(b).
84
E.g., Monsanto Co. v. Swann, 308 F. Supp. 2d 937, 941 (E.D. Mo. 2003) (“Planting and harvesting
seed is a ‘use’ under [35 U.S.C. §] 271(a)”).
85
Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. at 915.
86
Id. at 920-21.
87
CHISUM, supra note 80, at § 16.02(2).
88
Id.
89
Hilary Preston, Drift of Patented Genetically Engineered Crops: Rethinking Liability Theories, 81
TEX. L. REV. 1153, 1163-64 (2003).
90
Id.
91
527 U.S. 627, 645 (1999).
81
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Intent does play some role in the determination of damages.92 A willful infringer
may have to pay treble damages and attorney’s fees if the court deems it necessary to
deter future infringers.93 The penalty for unintentional infringement may be damage
calculations.94 Although Schmeiser was found to have infringed, he considers the
litigation a victory since Monsanto was not entitled to damages, court costs or technology
fees.95
¶22
Intentional infringement is presumed once a defendant has notice that he or she is
infringing another’s patent.96 In the United States, an infringing defendant with no
knowledge of infringement (intent) is very rare because most infringers are put on notice
before they are sued.97 Problems occur with GM plant patents because infringing plants
cannot be distinguished from the non-infringing plants without specialized tests or
inspections. Once the infringer is put on notice, the process of stopping infringement is
not easy. A Catch-22 arises because the only way to identify an infringing plant, aside
from microscopic inspection, is to spray Roundup® and see if the crop survives.98 This
process, however, would destroy all non-infringing canola plants. Also, destroying all of
a farmer’s plants will not stop infringement because dormant seeds are likely to emerge
years later.99 In order for a farmer to completely rid his or her fields of GM seeds, the
soil must be replaced, which is a very expensive procedure.100 If replacing the soil is
financially infeasible, the farmer’s only other option is to tie himself to Monsanto through
a license.
¶21

VII.
¶23

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SCHMEISER DECISION

The Schmeiser case is binding only in Canada, yet this unprecedented case will
likely serve as an example for the world to follow.101 Monsanto has filed 100 seed piracy
cases in the United States and so far has recovered over $15 million.102 To date,
Monsanto has prevailed in every case.103 Whether the Schmeiser case had any influence
is not expressly stated in the decisions, although Canadian and U.S. patent principles are
so closely related that it appears an American farmer in Schmeiser’s case would suffer
the same fate.

92

35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
Id.
94
Kershen, supra note 66, at 583.
95
Percy Schmeiser, Percy Schmeiser Claims Moral and Personal Victory in Supreme Court Decision,
May 22, 2004, http://www.percyschmeiser.com/decisioncomments.htm.
96
CHISUM, supra note 80, at § 16.02(2).
97
Id. at § 16.02 N. 1 (Supp. 2005).
98
Preston, supra note 89, at 1159.
99
Id. at 1160.
100
Id.
101
Stephen Leahy, Monsanto ‘Seed Police’ Watching Farmers (available at LEXIS, IPS-Inter Press
Service, Jan. 14, 2005).
102
Paul Elias, Saving Seed is Latest Tech Piracy, Jan. 14, 2005,
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,66282,00.html.
103
Id.
93
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¶24

Monsanto’s position is that a farmer who finds infringing plants should contact
them and request removal of the patented plants.104 This solution, however, will not
solve the problem of innocent infringers having to pay Monsanto. Farmers may worry
because even if Monsanto removes infringing plants, as demonstrated above, this does
not guarantee total eradication of plants containing the patented gene from the farmer’s
field. Also, what if Monsanto inadvertently destroys non-infringing crops, since it is
impossible to distinguish between GM and mundane crops without specialized tests?
Would farmers receive compensation from Monsanto for the innocent crops destroyed?105
Although the farmers took no action in acquiring the gene, they could suffer increased
costs and decreased profits in order to deal with the imposing vegetation.
¶25
One of the biggest threats to farmers is the simple fear of being sued and having to
pay to defend themselves in court. It may not be a grounded fear that the company will
go after every farmer with even a trace of its property on their fields, but the average
farmer can hardly be expected to have the resources to defend himself in court should he
be found in violation. Monsanto’s teams of intellectual property experts and fierce
litigators likely create fear that a court will put blame on a farmer for infringement,
regardless of his intent to infringe. In addition, there are other economic effects of
windblown seeds. Organic farmers can lose their USDA and other organic certifications
if contamination is detected, which the American courts have recognized can cause
substantial economic losses.106 European countries and Japan have banned many and in
some cases all types of food items containing GMOs.107
¶26
The goal of patent law is to reward the inventor proportionally to the social benefit.
That balance is clearly disrupted by holding non-benefiting users liable for patent
infringement.108 If non-benefiting users are held liable, then costs in the users’ enterprise
will be greater than the true social cost of the activity, and incentives to engage in that
enterprise will be inefficiently low.109 For example, many farmers in Canada and the
United States will find themselves signing Monsanto’s technology license instead of
going to court to defend themselves.110 In many cases similar to Schmeiser, Monsanto
may not be entitled to any damages, but Mosanto certainly has significant resources to
pursue licenses and intimidate farmers.
¶27
Joe Mendelson, the legal director for the Centre for Food Safety, asserted that
“Monsanto’s business plan for [GM crops] depends on suing farmers.”111 The costs of
litigation make fighting an issue of infringement unfeasible for most farmers. Schmeiser
spent $400,000 (Canadian) on his battle with Monsanto.112 On Schmeiser’s website, he
claims to have received hundreds of phone calls from farmers in similar situations.113
104

Clark, supra note 69.
Aoki, supra note 3, at 297; Preston, supra note 89, at 1172.
106
Preston, supra note 89, at 1161.
107
Id. at 1162.
108
Siebrasse, supra note 75, at 365-66.
109
Id.
110
Aoki, supra note 3, at 297.
111
Leahy, supra note 101.
112
Id.
113
Monsanto Harassment Continues to Intensify, http://percyschmeiser.com/Harassment.htm (last
visited Nov. 17, 2005).
105
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These farmers have received threatening letters to pay up or go to court.114 The Centre
for Food Safety believes that hundreds of farmers have been coerced into paying
technology fees to avoid costly litigation.115 With Monsanto’s budget of $10 million and
a staff of 75 investigators, it is easy to see that farmers are sorely lacking the legal
resources to combat Monsanto.116
¶28
In addition to the disparity in resources between Monsanto and potential defendants
in GM seed cases, Monsanto’s technology agreements include silencing provisions.117
These silencing provisions make it difficult to estimate how many of Monsanto’s
investigations, of which there are approximately 500 per year,118 result in licensing
agreements. They also make it extraordinarily difficult for farmers to collaborate and
learn from the experiences of others in similar situations. The balance between society’s
gain and Monsanto’s reward is heavily skewed in Monsanto’s favor.
VIII.

TO WHAT EXTENT SHOULD INTENT MATTER IN PLANT PATENT INFRINGEMENT?

¶29

Some critics feel that the element of intent should be an added element to patent
infringement of a GM seed.119 Reasons for the addition deal with the GM plant’s ability
to self-propagate and spread without human intervention or participation.120 In addition,
truly innocent bystanders will not disrupt patent incentives.121 Unintentionally
possessing farmers will not gain any benefit from their infringement and the patent owner
will suffer no loss.122 The Canadian Supreme Court considered protection for “innocent
bystanders” in Harvard College v. Canada123 but refused to comment, concluding that
the proposal should be left up to legislators.124
¶30
Most critics, however, are against adding the element of intent to infringement of a
GMO.125 The most persuasive argument stems from the current definition of intent.
Intentional infringement occurs when an infringer is aware that something they are
utilizing is patented.126 In a Roundup Ready® canola case, farmers will almost certainly
be aware of the patent; it is the patented object’s presence and, therefore, their
infringement, of which they may not be aware.127
¶31
Requiring a defendant’s knowledge of a patent before damages can be awarded
encourages patent marking.128 Windblown seeds will not benefit from patent marking.
114
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Physically labeling the seed is impractical and once the seed is removed from a labeled
bag, it looks like any other canola seed. Another argument against the additional element
of infringement is the logistical problem of defining who may use the “innocent
bystander” defense.129 If an innocent bystander’s fields are contaminated, may the farmer
sell his or her seeds to other farmers and continue the practice of saving seeds?130 It
seems equitable to allow farmers to continue their traditional practices, but if allowed, a
trained farmer could concentrate the seed with the patented gene and sell it, thereby
acting as a competitor to the patent owner.131 Even if reselling were disallowed, farmers
may take advantage of the seed’s properties after learning of its presence and
advantages. 132
IX.

SHOULD THE STRAY ANIMALS DEFENSE BE APPLICABLE TO PLANT PATENT
INFRINGEMENT?

¶32

Schmeiser argued the stray animals defense was analogous and applicable to his
case.133 The stray animals defense is a property defense, which states that a person is
strictly liable for damage done by a trespassing animal that he or she owns.134 In
addition, offspring will belong to the person whose land has been trespassed.135
Therefore, if applied in a patented seed case, not only would the infringer not be
responsible for damages of the stray seed, but the farmer could also recover for trespass
and interruption of business in addition to keeping the infringing plants.136 Courts do not
allow persons who trespass willfully with their animals to benefit from their willful
conduct.137 The courts in Schmeiser concluded that licensing agreements, monitoring of
possible infringers, and removal of unintended infringing plants is sufficient action to
support the conclusion that Monsanto controlled its patented gene.138 Monsanto knew it
could not prevent seed from spreading.139 But should mere attempts to control the spread
of intellectual property be sufficient?
¶33
A comparison of animals and seeds explains why this defense should apply to
patented seed cases. First, both are living and reproduce without human intervention.
Certainly, in farming, there is some human intervention, but intervention is not required
for the plants’ reproduction. Second, there is a stronger reason for the stray animals
defense in seed cases because property rights are even harder to detect. Unlike collars or
who makes or sells patented articles, or a person who does so for or under the patentee is required to mark
the articles with the word ‘Patent’ and the number of the patent. The penalty for failure to mark is that the
patentee may not recover damages from an infringer unless the infringer was duly notified of the
infringement and continued to infringe after the notice.”).
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branding which are available for animal identification, GM plants can only be
distinguished in a laboratory. Additionally, once a farmer discovers an infringing plant, it
is more difficult to remove or return that property to its owner. Removing the property is
incredibly expensive as discussed above, and return of the property is equally difficult.
Finally, pollination actually converts the farmer’s property to the patent owner’s
protected property.
¶34
A critic of the stray animals defense analogized the seeds to escaped pigs.
Now suppose that the escaped pigs did some harm, perhaps by destroying
some crops. In that case, it is true that the neighbour should have a
remedy against the pigs’ owner, but again we would not suggest that the
remedy should be that the neighbour can keep the pigs. This is because
the harm to the neighbour and the proposed “remedy” are entirely
unrelated.140
¶35

The Supreme Court of Canada in Schmeiser rejected the stray animals defense
quickly because it did not believe property rights were applicable to patent protection.141
Monsanto had a right to the gene and cell and its exclusive use that is distinguishable
from stray animals.142 Ownership, the Court affirmed, is irrelevant to whether or not
something infringes another’s property right.143
X.

¶36

CONCLUSION

“But where a man willfully causes or allows the property of another to be intermixed with his own without the other’s knowledge or consent the whole belongs to the
latter. . . .”144 It is true that intellectual property rights are not fully consistent with
tangible property rights, but in the case of a farmer unintentionally acquiring a patented
seed, intellectual property rights do not seem totally appropriate. The unique nature of a
property that can contaminate the property of others and reproduce on its own was not
considered by lawmakers when they drafted the Patent Act. Something must be done to
protect innocent infringers from liability and coercion while encouraging innovation and
reward. Unfortunately, former Monsanto employees hold high positions both in the
Department of Agriculture as well as the Food and Drug Administration.145 These
agencies seem unlikely to move in a direction to help farmers battle the aggressive tactics
of companies like Monsanto. This situation is truly David versus Goliath, but this time,
Goliath is holding all the stones.
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